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Abstract: There is widespread concern that administration consumes too much of the 
educational dollar in traditional public schools, diverting needed resources from classroom 
instruction and hampering efforts to improve student outcomes.  By contrast, charter schools 
are predicted to have leaner administration and allocate resources more intensively to 
instruction. This study analyzes resource allocation in charter and district schools in Michigan, 
where charter and tradition public schools receive approximately the same operational funding.  
Controlling for factors that could affect resource allocation patterns between school types, we 
find that charter schools on average spend $774 more per pupil per year on administration and 
$1141 less on instruction than traditional public schools.  
Keywords: resource allocation; charter schools; school administration; school district spending. 
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Es la administración educativa más ágil en las escuelas charter? Asignación de recursos en 
escuelas charter y públicas tradicionales. 
Resumen: Existe una preocupación generalizada de que la administración escolar consume buena 
parte del presupuesto educativo en las escuelas públicas tradicionales, desviando recursos necesarios 
para la enseñanza en las aulas y obstaculizando esfuerzos para mejorar los resultados académicos de 
los estudiantes. En contraste con esta preocupación, otras perspectivas predicen que las escuelas 
charter tienen una administración ágil y asigna recursos para la instrucción con mayor intensidad. En 
este estudio se analiza la asignación de recursos en las escuelas charter y distritales en Michigan, 
donde las escuelas charter y públicas tradicionales reciben aproximadamente el mismo 
financiamiento. Controlando factores que podrían afectar los patrones de asignación de recursos 
entre los distintos tipos de escuela, encontramos con que las escuelas charter gastan en promedio 
774 dólares más por alumno por año en la administración y $ 1141 menos en la enseñanza que las 
escuelas públicas tradicionales. 
Palabras clave: asignación de recursos; escuelas chárter; administración escolar; gastos escolar. 
 
É a administração da educação mais ágil nas escolas charter? Alocação de recursos em 
escolas públicas tradicionais e charter. 
Resumo: Há uma preocupação generalizada de que a administração escolar consome grande parte 
dos orçamentos em escolas públicas tradicionais, desviando recursos destinados ao ensino em sala 
de aula e dificultando os esforços para melhorar o desempenho acadêmico dos alunos. Em contraste 
com esta preocupação, outras perspectivas preveem que as escolas charter tenham uma 
administração mais ágil e aloquem recursos para a instrução com maior intesidade. Este estudo 
analisa a alocação de recursos em escolas distritais e charter em Michigan, onde as escolas públicas 
tradicionais e charter recebem aproximadamente o mesmo financiamento. Controlando fatores que 
poderiam afetar os padrões de alocação de recursos entre os diferentes tipos de escolas, verificou-se 
que as escolas charter gastam em média $774 a mais por aluno por ano na administração e $1.141 a 
menos em instrução do que as escolas públicas tradicionais. 
Palavras-chave: alocação de recursos; escolas charter; administração escolar, despesas do distrito 
escolar. 
 
Introduction 
Public school leaders frequently confront the criticism that they fail to carry out their 
administrative duties efficiently. There is chronic and widespread concern that administration 
consumes too much of the education dollar. By this view, the diversion of resources from classroom 
instruction to bloated public school administrative structures has hampered efforts to improve 
student outcomes. One of the appealing prospects of charter schools, by contrast, is that as 
decentralized organizations compelled to compete for students, they will allocate their resources 
more intensively on instruction (Hill, Pierce, & Guthrie, 1997; Finn, Manno, & Vanourek, 2000). 
The financial and performance pressures on school administrators appear unlikely to fade any time 
soon. As the charter school movement matures and gains wider support among state and federal 
policy makers, it is fitting to examine how charter schools compare to traditional public schools 
(TPSs) in their allocation of resources for administration, instruction, and other functions. 
Researchers and policymakers have long wondered whether granting schools greater 
autonomy from district central administration to make resource allocation decisions would result in 
any real difference in spending patterns. Many observers anticipate that decentralizing budgeting 
authority from districts to schools will permit more efficient resource use that conforms better to 
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schools’ particular needs. The failure of school-based management initiatives in the 1980s to 
produce anticipated changes is often attributed to central administrations’ reluctance to relinquish 
control over resources (budgets, staffing). The charter school movement by contrast has established 
a widely implemented new model of school organization and governance in which the influence of 
district administrators on resource allocation in most cases has been entirely banished.  So what is 
different about how charter schools use their resources?     
 This paper analyzes resource allocation patterns for all charter schools and traditional public 
schools in Michigan, a state with one of the nation’s longest running charter school programs and 
over 265 charter schools. Unlike many states, charter schools and tradition public schools in 
Michigan receive approximately the same level of operational funding and the state collects uniform, 
audited financial data from both. We direct our attention to three main issues. First, we analyze the 
level and source of funding in charter schools and TPSs. Second, we analyze differences in spending 
patterns between charter schools and TPSs across disaggregated educational service functions. 
Third, we use regression analysis to control for several factors that may affect resource allocation on 
selected instructional and administrative functions to better isolate spending differences between 
charters and TPSs.   
Literature Review 
The study of educational resource allocation has traditionally focused on the distribution of 
state and federal revenues among local school districts with particular attention to equity in school 
funding. More recently, however, increasing attention has been directed to what happens to 
resources once they reach local districts and are allocated internally across alternative instructional 
and non-instructional services. In the mid-1990s, a series of studies sponsored by the CPRE 
Educational Finance and Productivity Center utilized bivariate statistical analyses to document 
patterns in school resource allocation across alternative functions (Monk, Roellke, Brent, 1996; 
Nakib, 1996; Odden, Monk, Nakib, & Picus, 1995). One of the striking findings of this research was 
the high degree of uniformity in the way public schools allocate spending across broad expenditure 
categories. For example, school districts in states across the U.S. consistently tend to devote roughly 
59-65 percent of their spending to instruction.  
 Local districts do, of course, vary to some extent in their internal resource allocation (e.g., 
among regular classroom instruction, special needs instruction, instructional support, administration, 
or operations and maintenance), and a small literature offers insights regarding systematic factors 
that account for these variations. Monk and Hussain’s (2000) analysis isolates the influence of 
structural factors such as district size (scale economies), per-pupil funding level, community wealth 
(resident preferences and ability to pay) and student socioeconomic characteristics. Small districts, 
for example, lack economies of scale so they tend to devote a larger share of their spending to 
administration than large districts that can lower the average cost of fixed administrative services by 
spreading them over more students. In addition, in districts with high per-pupil funding, 
instruction’s share of spending tends to decline as various discretionary support functions command 
a larger budget share (Monk et al., 1996; see also Baker, 2003).1  
 Much of the available literature on charter school finances addresses the revenue side of the 
budget. Attention has focused on mechanisms that states use to fund charters and comparisons of 
per-pupil funding levels in charters and TPSs. States differ widely in their funding arrangements and 
                                                
1 Empirical evidence on whether and how variations in spending shares affect the production of education outcomes 
remains decidedly mixed. In particular, the common presumption of an adverse impact of higher administrative 
spending is not necessarily supported by empirical analysis (Brewer, 1996; Taylor, et al. 2007). 
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formulas for charter schools (Nelson, Rubenstein, & Mahoney, 2004; Belfield, 2008), but available 
research indicates that in most states charter schools receive considerably less per-pupil revenue than 
traditional public schools (Belfield, 2008; Nelson, Muir, & Drown, 2003; Fordham Institute, 2005; 
Miron & Urschel, 2010). For example, Miron and Urschel’s recent study of charters in 21 states and 
the District of Columbia found that on average charter schools received $2,980 (or 21 percent) less 
in per-pupil operating revenues than traditional public schools, although the magnitude of the 
funding gap varies quite substantially across states. It would not be surprising if such differences in 
funding translated into systematic differences in spending patterns by charters and TPSs.  
Charter schools in most states are further disadvantaged by their inability to pay for capital 
facilities as do districts with long-term bonds financed by primarily by local property taxes. So while 
charters may receive financial support for facilities through state or federal start-up grants or 
through direct state facilities aid, many charters, unlike school districts, are forced to devote a 
portion of current operating expenditures to paying for buildings and capital equipment (Krop & 
Zimmer, 2005; Nelson et al., 2004). 
Some observers have noted such discrepancies in revenues in calling for increased funding 
for charter schools on equity grounds (e.g., Fordham Institute, 2005; Jacobowitz & Gyurko, 2004). 
Indeed the U.S. Department of Education established review criteria for the 2009-10 federal Race to 
the Top grant competition that sought to encourage states to establish funding parity between 
charter and traditional schools. 
Simple comparisons of per-pupil revenue, however, may not tell the full story.  On the one 
hand, some, but certainly not all, charter schools receive significant financial support from private 
sources (foundations, nonprofit charter management organizations, or parents) which is not fully 
reflected in state school finance data (Scott, 2009; Toch, 2010). Meanwhile, many charters do not 
provide the full range of services typically provided by TPSs, e.g., student transportation, special 
education, summer school, secondary as well as lower-cost elementary education (Arsen, Plank & 
Sykes, 1999; Miron & Urschel, 2010). So charter schools’ lower funding levels may correspond very 
roughly to a more modest set of services they provide. It remains an open question whether charter 
schools would provide more of these services, if their funding were to increase. A more compelling 
case for increased charter funding requires better information on charter spending patterns in 
settings where charter and TPS per-pupil funding is roughly equivalently. 
So how do charter schools compare to traditional public schools in their use of the 
education dollar? Do charters represent an organizational model in which more spending is devoted 
to teaching and less to administration (and other non-instructional services) as early advocates (e.g., 
Finn et al., 2000) predicted? While some observers have argued that charters with their greater 
spending flexibility do indeed spend more on instruction than traditional U.S. public schools (e.g., 
Hill & Roza, 2008) most available empirical evidence indicates otherwise. Compared to TPSs, 
charter schools appear to devote a smaller share of their funds to instruction and a higher share to 
administration (Miron & Nelson, 2002; Miron & Urschel, 2010; Nelson et al, 2003; Prince, 1999).  
The studies that have generated these surprising results, however, fail to adequately control 
for a number of factors unrelated to charter schools’ governance or organizational structure that 
previous research has found to influence resource allocation patterns in TPSs. Charter schools 
generally have smaller enrollments than districts and the associated lack of scale economies would be 
expected to generate higher per-pupil administrative costs. Likewise, if funding levels (the size of the 
pie) affect resource allocation (how the pie is sliced), as previous research on district spending 
indicates, then charters schools’ lower per-pupil funding may help account for differences in their 
spending patterns relative to TPSs. Many charters are newly formed schools, and it is possible that 
the start-up process entails higher administrative costs that diminish relative to other costs as 
schools mature. Also charter schools, compared to TPSs as a whole, are disproportionately located 
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in urban areas which could lead to lower spending on transportation, for example, but higher 
spending on building supervision and security. Finally, charter school resource allocation could be 
distinctively influenced by their use of contracted management services as distinct from their charter 
status itself.  About one-third of U.S. charter schools are managed by for-profit or nonprofit 
education management organizations (EMOs), although the share of charters that are EMO-
managed versus self-managed varies substantially across states (Miron & Urschel, 2009; Molnar et 
al., 2009). While some early advocates predicted that EMOs would offer contracting schools the 
benefit of scale economies in the provision of non-instructional support services (e.g., Chubb, 2001), 
available evidence points to higher administrative spending in EMO-managed than self-managed 
charter schools (Miron & Urschel, 2010; Hanaway & Sharkey, 2004). EMO management is much 
more prevalent among charters than TPSs. So the influence of EMO management should be 
controlled in research that seeks to compare resource allocation patterns associated with charter and 
traditional public school organizational structures. 
In many states comparable data on charter school and district spending is difficult to obtain. 
Miron and Urschel (2010), for example, were unable to locate comparable finance data for charters 
and districts for 60 percent of the charter schools nationwide. In a number of states it is impossible 
to disentangle charter finances from the finances of their host districts. (See also Finn et al., 2005). 
In sum, charter school spending appears to differ in unexpected ways from TPS spending, 
including relatively higher administrative and lower instructional expenditures.  But charters differ 
systematically from traditional public schools on many dimensions that could affect observed 
spending patterns. Our analysis of charter and TPS finances in Michigan sets out to control these 
factors to obtain a clearer picture of differences in resource allocation associated with these two 
organizational forms.   
Charter Schools and Educational Finance in Michigan 
In 1993, Michigan became the eighth state to adopt a charter school law. A charter school, 
officially designated a public school academy (PSA), is a state-supported public school that operates 
independently under a charter granted by an authorizing body. In Michigan, PSAs can be chartered 
by local school districts, intermediate school districts, the state board of education or the governing 
boards of public community colleges or universities. Charter schools have no geographic 
boundaries. Students are free to choose to go to any charter school in the state, on a space available 
basis.  
Originally, no limit was imposed on the number of charters that could be issued by any of 
the authorizing boards. However, in 1996, following a proliferation of charters issued by the board 
of Central Michigan University, the state legislature imposed a cap on the total number of schools 
that may be chartered by Michigan’s 15 public universities. This cap of 150 schools limited new 
school development after 2000.  However, there was never a cap on the number of schools 
chartered by other organizations and in recent years the cap was progressively raised so the number 
of charter schools in Michigan has grown steadily over the past decade.  The state Legislature 
removed the cap in 2011. By 2008, Michigan had 265 charter schools enrolling about 98,000 
students (or 6 percent of the state’s public school population). In 2008, Michigan’s charter 
enrollment was the fifth largest in the nation after California Arizona, Florida, and Texas. Michigan’s 
charter schools are concentrated in central city and low-income suburban districts adjacent to central 
cities. By contrast, charter schools have generated relatively minor competitive pressures on high-
income suburban and rural districts.    
Michigan’s school finance system, commonly known as Proposal A, facilitated the charter 
policy’s implementation. Michigan’s charter schools are funded at a relatively high level compared to 
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other states, and their funding for current operations is roughly equal to that of Michigan’s 
traditional public schools. Approved in 1994, Proposal A shifted the responsibility for funding 
current operations from local districts to the state.  Besides state and federal categorical aid, both 
school districts and charter schools receive almost all their discretionary operating revenues from the 
state in the form of a per-pupil foundation grant.2 Charter schools receive a per-pupil foundation 
grant equal to that of the district in which the school is located, with the exception of charters in the 
state’s highest revenue districts. These 51 “hold-harmless” districts, comprising 10 percent of the 
state’s total districts, had per-pupil foundations in 1994-95 exceeding $6,500. Hold-harmless districts 
(most of which are in high-income suburbs) are eligible to levy additional local property taxes up to 
a cap established by the state that has increased by less than the rate of inflation since 1994. Under 
Proposal A, local voters can no longer increase local taxes to support school operations. Thus, the 
amount of operating revenue that districts and charter schools receive depends almost exclusively on 
the number of students they enroll.  
Funding for Michigan schools has been extremely tight in recent years due in large measure 
to a sustained decline in the state’s economy. After increasing by roughly 20 percent between 1994 
and 2002, Michigan’s combined state and local revenue, adjusted for inflation and student 
enrollment, fell by 15 percent ($1,507) between 2002 and 2008, a downward trajectory that has yet to 
be reversed.   
A few additional features of Michigan’s charter policies and schools are pertinent.  Nearly 80 
percent of Michigan’s charter schools are operated by for-profit EMOs, a share that is high in 
comparison to most states. The state’s charter schools have no taxing authority to pay for capital 
facilities. Most charter schools lease their buildings, often from an EMO, and make this payment 
through general fund expenditures. Under state law, schools chartered by a local school district are 
subject to the collective bargaining agreements in effect in their host districts, but less than 5 percent 
of the state’s charters have been authorized by local districts. Charter schools that employ their own 
staff are required to participate in the state’s defined-benefit school employee pension system (the 
Michigan School Personnel Retirement System), but personnel who are hired through an EMO to 
work in a charter school are prohibited from participating in MSPERS. Although the state sets 
MSPERS benefit levels, the system is financed by contributions from local districts (and 
participating charter schools). This mandatory contribution is adjusted annually and calculated as a 
percentage of current payroll needed to keep the system actuarially sound. The MSPERS 
contribution rate has exceeded 20 percent in recent years. By contrast, EMO’s can establish defined-
contribution retirement plans (e.g., 401k’s) for their employees, which are typically far less expensive 
than the state’s pension system. 
Data Sources 
The data for this study come from the State of Michigan’s Center for Education 
Performance and Information (CEPI). Financial data for all districts and charter schools were 
obtained from CEPI’s Financial Information Database. We also obtained data on student 
characteristics (e.g., free- and reduced-priced lunch, special education) from CEPI. CEPI’s 
Educational Entity Master database was the source for information on a number of charter school 
characteristics such as the year opened, charter authorizer, grades served, and management status 
                                                
2 The revenue generated by a uniform property tax of 18 mills on non-homestead property stays in local districts and is 
counted as local revenue in the state school finance data. But this revenue does not augment districts’ foundation 
revenue, since the state reduces the foundation revenue it sends to a district by the amount of the district’s locally-
generated non-homestead property tax revenue. 
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(self-managed versus EMO-managed). All data used in this study correspond to the 2007-08 
academic year. 
Under Michigan’s charter school law, charter schools have the same legal status as school 
districts and they report all data used in this study on the same basis as districts. In order to receive 
their state aid payments, charter schools, like school districts, must annually submit to the state 
uniform and detailed reports of their revenues and expenditures that have been audited by a certified 
public accountant. Consequently the data available for comparing resource allocation in Michigan’s 
charters and TPSs is much better than in many other states.   
Fifty-one of Michigan’s 552 school districts are single-building districts. Thirty of these are 
elementary districts, that offer no secondary education, and 22 are single-building K-12 districts. 
These single-school districts are a fading legacy of an earlier era.  Since they are similar in size to 
charter schools, however, they provide one benchmark for comparing charter revenues and 
expenditures in the analysis that follows.  
Charter and School District Revenues 
As shown in Table 1, operational funding levels for Michigan’s charter schools closely 
approximates that of the state’s traditional public schools. The table displays revenues, by source, for 
four groups of schools: all school districts, all school districts except the 51 high-revenue hold-
harmless districts, single-building districts, and charter schools. All mean values in the table are pupil 
weighted (a 2,000-pupil district is weighted double a 1,000-student district) so the statewide figures 
accurately reflect the statewide school group averages and is not influenced by the size distribution 
of schools within groups.   
 
Table 1  
Revenue Sources for Michigan School Districts and Charter Schools, 2007-2008 
 
All School 
 Districts 
All Non-Hold- 
Harmless School  
Districts 
Single Building  
School Districts 
Charter  
Schools 
  
Mean $ 
per pupil 
% of 
 total 
Mean $ 
per pupil 
% of 
total 
Mean $  
per pupil 
% of  
total 
Mean $  
per 
pupil 
% of 
 total 
         
Total Local                         1974 22.0 1628 18.7 4900 49.0 236 2.7 
Total State                      6441 71.9 6484 74.7 4541 45.4 7727 84.0 
    Unrestricted aid 5739 64.0 5768 66.4 4091 40.9 7281 5.2 
    Categorical aid 702 7.8 716 8.2 450 4.5 447 89.1 
Total Federal                      550 6.1 573 6.6 552 5.5 708 8.2 
         
Total Revenue                              8964 100.0 8685 100.0 9992 100.0 8671 100.0 
         
Pupil-weighted means. 
 
The average per-pupil revenue of Michigan’s charter schools in 2007-08 was $8,671 or just 
three percent below the average revenue for all the state’s school districts ($8,964). If we exclude the 
hold-harmless districts, the average revenue in the remaining school districts is nearly equal to the 
charter school average. Less than 15 percent of Michigan’s charter schools are located in hold-
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harmless districts and many of the students attending these charters live in nearby non-hold-
harmless districts.   
Since we are interested in spending patterns and some revenues come with restrictions on 
their use, it is important to note that charter schools’ per-pupil discretionary or unrestricted revenue 
is also on a par with that of district schools. This discretionary revenue is comprised by the local 
revenue plus the unrestricted state aid (the sum of which corresponds to the per-pupil foundation 
grant). The mean discretionary revenue for charter schools ($7,517) is slightly below the level for all 
districts ($7,713) and slightly above the level for non-hold-harmless districts ($7,396). Charter 
schools receive somewhat less state categorical aid than district schools, and this is mainly 
attributable to lower special education enrollment rates in charters than TPSs. Meanwhile charter 
schools receive $135 to $150 more federal revenue per pupil than traditional public schools 
depending on the district comparison group.   
In short, although the funding sources differ somewhat for charter and district schools, the 
total operational revenues for both sets of schools in Michigan is very similar which establishes a 
highly desirable basis for comparing their resource allocation patterns.  
Charter and School District Expenditure Patterns 
Despite similar funding levels, there are large differences in how Michigan districts and 
charter schools spend their revenues. There is also a great deal more variation in spending patterns 
among charter schools than among school districts. We offer an initial view of these resource 
allocation patterns in Table 2, which displays the distribution of spending across disaggregated 
instructional and non-instructional service functions for the same school groups as in Table 1. For 
each functional category, Table 2 presents mean per-pupil expenditures and the function’s share of 
total expenditures. Each functional category includes expenditures on all objects devoted to the 
provision of the given service, e.g., employee salaries and benefits, supplies, and purchased services.  
The figures in Table 2 distinguish three types of administrative services: general 
administration, business services, and school administration. General administration includes 
expenditures on a district or charter school’s board and executive administration (e.g., 
superintendent, assistant superintendents, legal fees, etc.).  For charter schools managed by an EMO, 
the portion of the EMO’s service fees, which is devoted to executive administration falls under 
“general administration.” Business office services include purchasing, budgeting, accounting, payroll, 
duplicating, printing, mail services, and some short-term interest payments. School administration 
includes spending on principals, assistant principals and their clerical staff.   
Charter schools spend substantially less on instruction and instructional support than 
traditional public schools. On average, charters spend nearly $1,700 less per pupil on instruction and 
another $400 less on instructional support than districts. As a share of total expenditures, Michigan’s 
districts devote 61 percent to instruction, while charters devote only 47 percent. Charter schools 
spend less on both basic instruction and added needs instruction (special, compensatory, career-tech 
and adult education). Seventy percent of charters’ lower total instructional spending is attributable to 
basic instruction ($1,128 less) and 30 percent to added needs instruction ($508 less).3  Under added 
needs instruction, the largest discrepancy between charters and TPSs occurs in special education, 
where districts spend over $500 more per pupil annually than charters. Nine percent of charter 
schools have no special education expenditures.  
                                                
3 Table 2 does not display disaggregated expenditures for a number of small instructional categories such as adult 
education that are included in the total instruction figures.  
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Turning to instructional support services, by comparison to TPSs, charter schools spend 
about $300 less per pupil on student services (e.g., guidance, speech therapists, health, social work) 
and roughly $100 less on instructional staff support (e.g., library, computer labs, curriculum 
specialists, instructional staff supervision). 
 
Table 2  
Resource Allocation in Michigan Schools, 2007-2008 
 All School 
Districts 
All Non-hold-
harmless School  
Districts 
Single Building 
School Districts 
Charter 
Schools 
 Mean $ 
Per 
Pupil 
% of 
Total 
Mean $ 
Per 
Pupil 
% of 
Total 
Mean $ 
Per 
Pupil 
% of 
Total 
Mean $ 
Per 
Pupil 
% of 
Total 
         
Instruction                          5629 60.5 5482 60.7 6141 62.3 3942 47.4 
Total basic instruction                            4321 46.5 4166 46.2 5132 52.1 3193 38.4 
Total added needs 
instruction                      1256 13.5 1259 14.0 989 10.0 748 9.0 
Special education  846 9.1 843 9.3 544 5.5 305 3.7 
Compensatory ed  295 3.2 300 3.3 428 4.3 425 5.1 
Career tech 
education                     115 1.2 116 1.3 17 0.2 19 0.2 
         
Instructional Support                                961 10.3 893 9.9 404 4.1 551 6.6 
Student services  580 6.2 540 6.0 211 2.1 274 3.3 
Instructional staff 
support  381 4.1 353 3.9 194 2.0 277 3.3 
         
Administration                           906 9.7 888 9.8 1426 14.5 1886 22.7 
General administration                            149 1.6 152 1.7 688 7.0 915 11.0 
Business services 187 2.0 182 2.0 306 3.1 252 3.0 
School administration  570 6.1 553 6.1 432 4.4 719 8.7 
         
Operation & Maintenance  1042 11.2 1010 11.2 1137 11.5 1429 17.2 
Transportation  459 4.9 460 5.1 598 6.1 55 0.7 
Other Support  219 2.4 211 2.3 132 1.3 246 3.0 
         
Facilities Acquisition  10 0.1 10 0.1 9 0.1 163 2.0 
         
Total Expenditures                        9297 100.0 9025 100.0 9858 100.0 8309 100.0 
Pupil-weighted means
 
While they spend a great deal less on instruction and instructional support than traditional 
public schools, Michigan’s charter schools spend a great deal more on administration. Charters 
spend about $900 more per pupil annually on total administrative services than districts statewide, 
and about $1,000 more than the non-hold-harmless districts. While Michigan districts overall devote 
less than 10 percent of their expenditures to administration, charter schools devote a striking 23 
percent of the educational dollar to administration. This higher spending occurs in every 
administrative function, but it is concentrated in general administration.  
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The higher administrative spending in Michigan’s single-building school districts relative to 
all districts suggests that some of the increased administrative spending by charters may be due to 
their lack of scale economies. Compared to all districts, single-building districts spend $520 more on 
administration, or 15 percent of total expenditures. Yet single-building districts still spend $560 less 
per pupil on administration than charters. This higher administrative spending in small school 
districts underscores the importance controlling for this and other extraneous factors when 
comparing TPS and charter resource allocation, as well we do shortly.  
Charter schools annually spend nearly $400 per pupil more than districts on operations and 
maintenance. This discrepancy is attributable to the fact that most of Michigan’s charter schools 
lease their buildings, since they do not have access to debt millages, and these rental payments are 
recorded under operations and maintenance.4  This disadvantage that charters face in facilities 
finance is completely offset by the fact that charters spend about $400 less per year on student 
transportation services than traditional public schools. Most charter schools in Michigan do not 
offer full transportation services, and nearly half of all charters devote no expenditures to 
transportation at all. 
  One final point from Table 2 is worth noting. Despite the fact that Michigan’s charter and 
traditional public schools receive very similar levels of per-pupil funding on average, charter schools’ 
total expenditures are nearly $1,000 less than district schools statewide. Most of this difference is 
reflected in changes in districts’ and charters’ fund balances. In 2007-08, a year in which the state of 
Michigan provided essentially no increase in per-pupil funding while costs associated for instance 
with employee health and retirement benefits continued to rise, many districts were forced to 
balance their budgets by drawing down accumulated savings in their fund balance. Even in this tight 
financial environment, however, charter schools were able to add on average about $362 per pupil to 
their fund balances  
Resource Allocation Estimation Strategies 
We turn now to specify models designed to provide a clearer picture of the determinants of 
school resource allocation. Our basic model takes the following form:  
     Yi = CSiB1 + SDstructureiB2 + SDchariB3 + ui           (1) 
where Yi is the expenditure variable of interest in district or charter school i. Specifically Yi is a set of 
measures of instructional and administrative spending (expressed as both per pupil and share of total 
spending). We distinguish between administrative functions which traditionally in districts have been 
associated with the school level, on the one hand, and the central office level (i.e., general 
administration and business services), on the other.  Charter schools are identified by CSi, which is 
measured, alternately, in two ways in each of our regression models. First, charter schools are 
represented simply as a dummy variable in each model. Second, charter schools are represented 
through a series of interaction terms that capture the effects of specific charter school organizational 
features. We include the number of years a charter school has been in operation, since administrative 
spending in particular may decline in relative terms as charters mature beyond their initial start-up 
phase. We also include an indicator for charter schools that are managed by an EMO since, as noted 
earlier, EMO management may have distinctive influences on resource allocation. Finally, we include 
a measure of the grade levels offered by a charter school to assess the possibility that charters 
                                                
4 Most facilities acquisition by school districts is financed through transactions in a separate debt account, not the general 
fund account that serves as the basis for data in Table 2.  Some districts, however, do make small expenditures for 
facilities acquisition with general fund revenues, and, as Table 2 indicates, charter schools devote somewhat more general 
fund revenue to facilities acquisition (about $163 per pupil, per year on average).  
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serving exclusively elementary grades have different resource allocation patterns than charters 
serving secondary grades or a mixture of elementary and secondary grades. This is motivated by the 
hypothesis that the instructional costs for elementary grades are lower than those for secondary 
grades.  
 SDstructure i is a vector of structural characteristics of district or charter school i that is 
informed by previous research on factors affecting district resource allocation (e.g., Monk and 
Hussain, 2000). SDstructure i includes district enrollment size and enrollment size squared, total 
revenue per pupil, and a dummy variable reflecting whether the district or charter school is located 
in a rural area. District enrollment size controls for scale effects on resource allocation, especially the 
share of spending devoted to administration, which ceteris paribus tends to be higher in very small 
districts. The quadratic term (Enrollment2) captures the possibility of a U-shaped relationship 
between average cost and size; that is, after declining over some range of increasing district size, 
average costs increases in very large enrollment districts (Andrews, et al, 2002). Total revenue per 
pupil is included to control for the fact that the share of spending devoted to support services tends 
to increase in districts with higher overall spending levels. The rural dummy captures distinctive 
geographical influences such as higher per-pupil transportation costs and lower employee wages and 
salaries in rural as compared to metropolitan areas, as well as possible systematic differences in 
family preferences for various school services. 
 SDchar i is a vector of district student characteristics, which control for some of the effects 
of student needs and family preferences on school resource allocation. Dchar i includes the percent 
of students who receive special education services (which directly affects added needs instructional 
spending) and the percentage of students eligible for the free/reduced price lunch (FRL) that 
captures instructional needs associated with student poverty as well as systematic differences in 
community preferences for different school services. ui is the unobserved error. We estimate 
Equation (1) with OLS regressions.   
Resource Allocation Model Findings 
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of our regression models for administrative expenditures. 
The dependent variables for Table 3’s models are expressed as per-pupil administrative 
expenditures, whereas the models in Table 4 take administrative expenditures as a percentage of 
total expenditures as the dependent variables. Both tables show results for three measures of 
administrative spending: (1) total administration (i.e., general administration+business 
services+school administration) (2) general administration and business services, and (3) school 
administration. For each dependent variable we estimate equations with and without a series of 
interaction terms that capture the influence of specific charter school characteristics. 
Before considering the results for the charter school variables, we briefly summarize the 
findings for the control variables. The enrollment terms in Table 3 clearly indicate the presence of 
scale economies in education administration. Moreover, these scale economies (lower costs as size 
increases) are fully realized through the traditional central office administrative functions (general 
administration and business services), rather than in school-level administration. In addition, the 
significant results for the quadratic term (Enrollment2) indicate that there is a tipping point beyond 
which increasing district size is associated with rising central office expenditures.5 The estimated 
                                                
5 The tipping point, call it E*, is obtained by solving the equation, AdminExp/pupil = aE + bE2, for the value of E that 
minimizes AdminExp/pupil. Differentiating with respect to E and setting this equal to zero gives E*= -a/2b, which can 
be solved by substituting the regression coefficients for Enrollment and Enrollment2 for a and b.  
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coefficients in Table 3 indicate that this minimum occurs at a district enrollment between 55,000 and 
57,000. Only one district in Michigan, Detroit, is above this enrollment threshold. 
 
Table 3    
Administrative Expenditure Models 
(Per-Pupil Administrative Expenditures) 
Dependent variable Total 
Administration  
General Administration & 
Business Services 
School  
Administration 
Constant  100.423 
(77.045) 
 104.163 
(72.77) 
 -195.27** 
(65.034) 
 -194.70** 
(62.432) 
 295.70** 
(59.605) 
 298.87** 
(57.917) 
Enrollment/1000 
 
 -32.863** 
(7.211) 
 -32.793** 
(6.779) 
 -38.399** 
(6.087) 
 -38.343** 
(5.815) 
 5.536 
(5.579) 
 5.55 
(5.395) 
(Enrollment/1000)2  .296** 
(.079) 
 .299** 
(.074) 
 .333** 
(.066) 
 .335** 
(.063) 
 -.037 
(.061) 
 -.036 
(.059) 
Total revenue per 
pupil/$1000 
 .115** 
(.006) 
 .115** 
(.005) 
 .100** 
(.005) 
 .101** 
(.005) 
 .015** 
(.004) 
 .014** 
(.004) 
% Free and reduced 
lunch 
 3.218** 
(.709) 
 2.458** 
(.676) 
 2.471** 
(.598) 
 2.07** 
(.58) 
 .747 
(.548) 
 .387 
(.538) 
% Special education  -11.591** 
(2.987) 
 -10.236** 
(2.828) 
 -16.695** 
(2.521) 
 -16.985** 
(2.427) 
 5.104*  
(2.311) 
 6.749** 
(2.251) 
Rural  19.796 
(36.644) 
 39.891 
(34.714) 
 65.657*  
(30.931) 
 79.117** 
(29.782) 
 -45.861 
(28.35) 
 -39.226 
(27.629) 
Charter school 773.729** 
(44.669) 
 874.352** 
(121.304) 
 505.596** 
(37.705) 
511.288** 
(104.07) 
 268.132** 
(34.558) 
363.064** 
(96.544) 
Charter school 
years in operation  
 -29.802** 
(8.271)  
 -9.652 
(7.096)  
 -20.151** 
(6.583) 
Charter school* 
EMO   
 311.833** 
(68.519)  
191.549** 
(58.784)  
 120.284*  
(54.533) 
Charter school* 
Mixed grade level  
 -90.896 
(61.235)  
 -22.601 
(52.536)  
 -68.295 
(48.736) 
Charter school* 
High school  
 -118.487 
(80.78)  
 -312.12** 
(69.304)  
193.633** 
(64.292) 
R-squared 0.66 0.69 0.64 0.67 0.15 0.19 
*: P< 0.05; **: P<0.01. 
 
 Districts in rural areas also spend more per pupil on general administration and business 
services (ranging from $65 to $79 more in the estimated equations). Although school-level 
administrative spending tends to be lower in rural areas, this difference was not statistically 
significant. The highly significant results for total revenue per pupil indicate that for every $1,000 
increase in per pupil funding, districts (or charter schools) devote an additional $115 to 
administrative expenditures, which is split between a $100 increase in general administration and 
business services and a $15 increase in school administration. Increases in the share of students who 
are low-income is associated with a significant increase in spending on general administration and 
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business services, but is not significantly related to school-level administrative spending. Finally, 
increases in the percentage of students who receive special education services, is associated with 
slightly lower total administrative spending, as lower spending on central office functions more than 
offset small increases in school-level administrative expenditures. 
Now consider the results in Table 3 for the administrative spending of charter schools with 
all the preceding variables held constant. Overall charter schools spend substantially more on 
administration than district schools and this estimated increased spending is highly significant 
statistically. In the simplest equations without the interaction term variables, Michigan charter 
schools spend $774 per-pupil more on administration than traditional public schools. About two-
thirds of this higher administrative spending occurs in general administration and business services 
($506) and one-third in school administration ($268).   
The models in Table 3 also account for variations among charter schools in their 
administrative spending. Charter administrative expenditures tend to decline the longer the schools 
are in operation. This may reflect unusually high administrative spending during charter schools’ 
early years in operation. It might also reflect the eventual closure of charter schools with 
extraordinarily high administrative spending. Administrative spending also varies significantly by 
charter schools’ grade configuration. The omitted schools for the grade level interaction terms in 
Table 3 are elementary schools, so the results for the secondary and mixed-grade charter school 
variables reflect expenditure differences relative to elementary charters. Spending on general 
administration and business services is $312 per pupil less in secondary than elementary charters, but 
school-level administration costs $194 more. Meanwhile administrative spending in mixed-grade 
charters does not differ significantly from administrative spending in elementary charters.  Finally, 
charter schools managed by EMOs spend significantly more on administration than self-managed 
charters (about $312 per pupil). This higher spending occurs in administrative functions traditionally 
performed at both the district central office and school building levels.   
Table 4 displays regression models that are identical to those in Table 3, except that the 
administrative expenditure variables that serve as dependent variables are expressed as a percentage 
of total expenditures. The results for all the explanatory variables in Table 3 are sustained in Table 
4’s models, with the exception not surprisingly of the total revenue per pupil variable. As funding 
levels increase, districts and charters devote a higher share of spending to general administration and 
business services and a smaller share to school administration. Controlling for other factors, the 
share of total spending devoted to administration is 10 percentage points higher in Michigan’s 
charter schools than in school districts.  
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Table 4  
Administrative Expenditure Models  
(Administration Expenditures as % of Total Expenditures) 
Dependent variable 
Total 
Administration 
General 
Administration & 
Business Services 
School  
Administration 
Constant 12.902** 
(.777) 
12.789** 
(.728) 
5.389** 
(.677) 
5.393** 
(.638) 
7.513** 
(.581) 
7.396** 
(.567) 
Enrollment/1000 
 
-.351** 
(.073) 
-.357** 
(.068) 
-.367** 
(.063) 
-.371** 
(.059) 
.016 
(.054) 
.014 
(.053) 
(Enrollment/1000)2 .003** 
(.001) 
.003** 
(.001) 
.003** 
(.001) 
.003** 
(.001) 
0 
(.001) 
0 
(.001) 
Total revenue per 
pupil/$1000 
-.054 
(.056) 
-.045 
(.053) 
.146** 
(.049) 
.16** 
(.046) 
-.199** 
(.042) 
-.205** 
(.041) 
% Free and reduced 
lunch 
.026** 
(.007) 
.021** 
(.007) 
.024** 
(.006) 
.021** 
(.006) 
.001 
(.005) 
0 
(.005) 
% Special education 
 
-.113** 
(.03) 
-.1** 
(.028) 
-.134** 
(.026) 
-.137** 
(.025) 
.021 
(.023) 
.038 
(.022) 
Rural .773* 
(.369) 
.848* 
(.347) 
1.042** 
(.322) 
1.117** 
(.304) 
-.269 
(.277) 
-.269 
(.27) 
Charter school 10.292** 
(.45) 
9.223** 
(1.213) 
7.133** 
(.393) 
5.906** 
(1.063) 
3.159** 
(.337) 
3.317** 
(.945) 
Charter school 
years in operation  
-.115 
(.083)  
-.03 
(.073)  
-.085 
(.064) 
Charter school*EMO  
 
3.366** 
(.685)  
2.551** 
(.601)  
.815 
(.534) 
Charter school*Mixed  
grade level  
-.577 
(.612)  
.177 
(.537)  
-.755 
(.477) 
Charter school*High 
school  
-1.401 
(.808)  
-2.854** 
(.708)  
1.453* 
(.629) 
R-squared 0.64 0.67 0.58 0.62 0.21 0.22 
 *: P< 0.05; **: P<0.01. 
 
We shift our focus from administrative to instructional spending in Table 5, which presents 
the results for both the per-pupil and expenditure share models. Unlike the case of administrative 
spending, the models reveal no scale economies for the provision of instructional services. The per-
pupil spending model shows that $483 of an incremental increase of $1,000 in district revenue is 
devoted to instruction. And instructional spending increases significantly with increases in the share 
of students who are eligible for special education services.   
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Table 5  
Instructional Expenditure Models 
Dependent variable 
 
% of Expenditures 
 
Per Pupil Expenditures 
 
Constant 65.3** 
(1.169) 
64.976** 
(1.111) 
1141.055** 
(137.393) 
1122.918** 
(135.785) 
Enrollment/1000 
 
-.129 
(.109) 
-.134 
(.103) 
6.808 
(12.86) 
6.96 
(12.648) 
(Enrollment/1000)2 .001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
.01 
(.14) 
.005 
(.138) 
Total revenue per 
pupil/$1000 
0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
.483** 
(.01) 
.483** 
(.01) 
% Free and reduced lunch -.057** 
(.011) 
-.045** 
(.01) 
-5.335** 
(1.264) 
-4.551** 
(1.262) 
% Special education .09* 
(.045) 
.087* 
(.043) 
14.646** 
(5.326) 
14.241** 
(5.278) 
Rural 3.196** 
(.556) 
2.874** 
(.53) 
137.831* 
(65.347) 
119.838 
(64.775) 
Charter school -10.93** 
(.678) 
-12.307** 
(1.851) 
-1140.681** 
(79.658) 
-1234.693** 
(226.346) 
Charter school 
years in operation  
.457** 
(.126)  
37.742* 
(15.434) 
Charter school*EMO  
 
-4.707** 
(1.046)  
-428.838** 
(127.852) 
Charter school*Mixed grade  
level  
.544 
(.935)  
15.988 
(114.262) 
Charter school*High school 
 
1.544 
(1.233)  
188.611 
(150.731) 
R-squared 0.52 0.55 0.80 0.81 
*: P< 0.05; **: P<0.01 
 
As in the case of administrative spending, charter schools’ instructional spending differs 
dramatically from that of districts. Holding constant total revenue and other factors known to 
influence school resource allocation, charter schools spend a remarkable $1,140 less per-pupil on 
instruction annually than districts.6  Longer-established charter schools do spend more on 
instruction than newer charters, although the estimated coefficients imply that it would take more 
than 30 years of steady progress on this count to close the gap with district instructional spending. 
The increase in instructional spending as charter schools age exceed the decline in administrative 
spending as charter schools mature (shown in Table 3), which implies a small shift of spending 
                                                
6 Recall the actual difference in instructional spending between Michigan’s charters and districts, when other factors are 
not controlled as shown in Table 2, is $1,700. 
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(roughly $10 per year) from other functions besides administration to instruction.  Charter schools’ 
instructional spending, unlike their administrative spending, does not vary systematically by their 
grade level configuration. 
Finally, while charter schools as a whole have quite low instructional spending given their 
level of funding, instructional spending in EMO-managed charters is especially low. Michigan’s 
EMO charters spend $429 less per year on instruction than self-managed charter schools. The 
results in Table 3 imply that three-fourths of this reduced instructional spending (relative to self-
managed charters) is diverted to higher administrative expenditures in EMO-managed charters. 
Discussion 
Despite the fact that advocates of charter schools and privatization have long criticized 
public school bureaucracies as bloated and wasteful, it turns out that charter schools spend 
considerably more on administration than do traditional public schools. Charters’ outsized 
administrative spending, moreover, is simultaneously matched by exceptionally low instructional 
spending. If one were searching for a contemporary reform to shift resources from classroom 
instruction to administration, it is hard to imagine one that could accomplish this as decisively as 
charter schools have done in Michigan.   
One need not attach any normative judgment to charter schools’ lower instructional and 
higher administrative spending. It is certainly possible that there could be new ways of providing 
educational services associated with this sort of resource reallocation that are beneficial for students. 
The normative standard--that instructional spending is good and administrative spending is 
wasteful—cannot be ignored, however, simply because it has been advanced so relentlessly by critics 
of traditional public schools. Some have coupled their criticism of traditional public school spending 
with predictions that charter schools, freed from the inept or self-serving governance of elected 
school boards, will reallocate resources to instruction. These predictions are now proving false. 
Our focus in this paper has not been on uncovering why it is that charter schools spend so 
much on administration and less on instruction, but since roughly 84 percent of TPS expenditures 
are related to personnel costs much of the explanation must rest there. On average, charters pay 
lower salaries for teachers with similar credentials and experience, but they also employ a much less 
experienced (and less expensive) teaching force than TPSs (Cannata, 2008). The cost differences for 
employee health and retirement benefits are also large.7 Less attractive teacher compensation in 
charter schools appears to contribute to higher turnover rates than in TPSs (Burian-Fitzgerald, 
Luekens, & Strizek, 2004; Cannata, 2010; Harris, 2006, 2007). Some charter schools have embraced 
highly scripted instructional practices as a way to adapt to a low-cost, high-turnover teaching force. 
Indeed insofar as a school’s teachers lack experience and expertise, the demands and cost of 
administrative coordination and oversight will increase. 
 Charter schools’ higher administrative spending may also be related to the fact that they 
provide a more modest range of services than TPSs. On average, compared to traditional public 
schools, a lower share of charter school students have disabilities, and those charter students with 
disabilities tend to have milder and less costly disabilities (Arsen & Ray, 2004; Howe & Welner, 
2002; Miron & Urschel, 2010). Charters also disproportionately serve less-costly elementary students 
as opposed to secondary students. Charter schools also tend to spend less on adult education, 
                                                
7 The average per-pupil cost of retirement benefits for all TPS employees in Michigan in 2008 was $1020.  If an EMO-
managed charter school paid the same average salaries as Michigan’s TPSs and contributed 10 percent of payroll towards 
its employees’ retirement, the charter school would still save $450 per student relative to the cost of the state’s school 
employee retirement system. 
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community education, and a wide range of instructional support activities. Financial data for 
Michigan’s charters and TPSs depict all of these differences in service provision.       
Charter schools clearly operate in more competitive environments and within organizational 
structures that give greater sway to governance arrangements traditionally found in the private 
sector. In Michigan, charter schools have responded to these changes by devoting significantly more 
resources to administrative activities and less to instruction than traditional public schools. While 
there is little question that charter schools are offering a variety of promising practices that TPSs 
could usefully emulate, we nevertheless find patterns of charter school resource use that are at odds 
with prevailing conceptions of spending changes that are needed for school improvement. Rather 
charter schools have advanced a top-heavy reallocation of resources that mirrors the distributional 
shifts unfolding so dramatically over recent decades in the U.S. private sector (Mishel, Bivens, 
Gould, & Shierholz, 2012). 
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